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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Securities trading, especially in equities markets, increasingly takes place in electronic
limit order markets. The trading process in these markets feature high frequency
cycles made of two phases: (i) a “make liquidity” phase during which traders post
prices (limit orders), and (ii) a “take liquidity” phase during which limit orders are
hit by market orders, generating a transaction. The submission of market orders
depletes the limit order book of liquidity and ignites a new make/take cycle as it
creates transient opportunities for traders submitting limit orders.1 The speed at
which these cycles are completed determines the trading rate, a dimension of market
liquidity.
A trader reacts to a transient increase or decline in the liquidity of the limit
order book only when she becomes aware of this trading opportunity. Accordingly,
the dynamics of trades and quotes in limit order markets is in part determined by
traders’ monitoring decisions, as emphasized by some empirical studies (e.g., Biais et
al. (1995), Sandås (2001) or Holliﬁeld et al. (2004)). For instance, Biais, Hillion, and
Spatt (1995) observe that (p.1688): “Our results are consistent with the presence of
limit order traders monitoring the order book, competing to provide liquidity when it
is rewarded, and quickly seizing favorable trading opportunities.”
In practice, traders react with delay (possibly very short) to trading opportunities
because monitoring is costly as intermediaries (brokers, market-makers, etc...) have
limited monitoring capacity and choose to allocate their limited attention over many
markets.2 Hence, the trading rate and more generally the durations between events
(new quotes, trades etc...) are endogenous and determined by a trade-oﬀ between
the beneﬁt and cost of monitoring. In this paper, we develop a model of trading with
imperfect monitoring to study this trade-oﬀ and its impact on the trading rate. In
the process, we address two sets of related issues.
Firstly, algorithmic trading (the automation of monitoring and orders submission)
considerably decreases the cost of monitoring and revolutionizes the way liquidity is
provided and consumed. We use our model to study the eﬀects of this evolution on
the trading rate, the bid-ask spread, and welfare.
1These cycles are studied empirically in Biais, et al. (1995), Coopejans et al.(2003), Degryse et
al.(2005), and Large (2007).
2For instance, Corwin and Coughenour (2008) show that limited attention by market-makers
(“specialists”) on the ﬂoor of the NYSE aﬀects their liquidity provision.
2Tape A - NYSE Stocks Tape B - Other Stocks Tape C - NASDAQ Stocks
Make Fee Take Fee Make Fee Take Fee Make Fee Take Fee
BATS -24 25 -24 25 -24 25
EDGX -25 30 -30 30 -25 30
LavaFlow -24 27 -24 27 -24 27
Nasdaq -20 30 -20 30 -20 30
NYSEArca -23 30 -22 30 -23 30
Table 1: Fees per share (in cents for 100 shares) for limit orders (Make Fee) and
market orders (Take Fee) on diﬀerent trading platforms in the US. A minus sign
indicates a rebate. Some platforms use volume-based schedules. The table only
shows trading platforms’ base pricing. Source: Traders Magazine, August 2009
Secondly, we study the role and eﬀects of so called make/take fees. In each
transaction, the “make fee” is the fee charged on the side “making liquidity” (i.e.,
posting a limit order) and the “take fee” is the fee charged on the side “taking
liquidity” (i.e., submitting a market order). For instance, Table 1 gives the make/take
fees charged on liquidity makers and liquidity takers for several US equity trading
platforms, as of August 2009. All these platforms pay a rebate on executed limit
orders and cover this cost by charging a fee on liquidity takers (so called “access
fees”). This pricing policy is also used by a few European trading platforms and has
been recently adopted in some option markets in the US.
Make/take pricing schedules result in signiﬁcant monetary transfers between mar-
ket participants.3 This practice is very controversial. Market-making ﬁrms who use
highly automated strategies are generally in favor of make/take pricing, while other
market participants have voiced concerns that it could result in excessive fees for
liquidity takers.4 As a result, the SEC decided to cap take fees at $0.003 per share
(30% of the tick size) in equities markets. However, to our knowledge, there is no
economic analysis of make/take fees and their eﬀect on market quality. In this paper,
3For instance, in each transaction, BATS charges a fee of 0.25 cents per share on market orders
and rebates 0.24 cents on executed limit orders (see Table 1). On October 10, 2008, 838,488,549
shares of stocks listed on the NYSE were traded onB A T S( a b o u t9 %o ft h et r a d i n gv o l u m ei nt h e s e
stocks on this day); see BATS website: http://www.batstrading.com/. Thus, collectively on this
day, limit order traders involved in these transactions collected about $2.01 million in rebates from
BATS while traders submitting market orders paid about $2.09 million in fees to BATS.
4As an example of the controversies raised by these fees, see the petition for rule-
making regarding access fees in option markets, addressed by Citadel at the SEC at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-562.pdf. In this petition, Citadel supports a cap
on access fees. For a diﬀerent viewpoint on make/take fees, see the comments sent by GETCO
to the SEC at: http://www.getcollc.com/index.php/getco/commentletters/Schedule of Fees and
Charges.pdf.
3we ﬁll this gap by providing a theory of make/take fees.
We consider a trading platform with two types of traders: (i) those who post
quotes (the “market-makers”) and (ii) those who hit these quotes (the “market-
takers”). All market participants monitor the market to grab ﬂeeting trading op-
portunities. Speciﬁcally, a market-maker wants to be ﬁrst to post new quotes after
a transient increase in the bid-ask spread and a market-taker wants to be ﬁrst to
hit quotes when the bid-ask spread is tight. In choosing their monitoring intensity,
traders on each side trade-oﬀ the beneﬁt from a higher likelihood of being ﬁrst to
detect a proﬁt opportunity with the opportunity cost of monitoring. The model has
a rich set of testable implications.
First, the speed at which market-makers post good prices and the speed at which
these prices are hit are positively related because makers and takers’ monitoring
decisions reinforce each other. For instance, suppose that an exogenous shock induces
market-takers to monitor the market more intensively. Then, market-makers expect
more frequent proﬁt opportunities since good prices are hit more quickly. Hence, they
have an incentive to monitor more and as a consequence the market features good
prices more frequently, which in turn induces market-takers to monitor even more.
We show that this complementarity in traders’ speeds of reaction oﬀers a new
explanation for the clustering in durations between trades (see for instance Engle
and Russell (1998)). It also creates a coordination problem, which results in two
equilibria diﬀering in trading activity (i) an equilibrium with no monitoring and no
trading and (ii) an equilibrium with monitoring and trading.5
Second, the model implies that make/take fees can be used to maximize the
trading rate by optimally balancing the speeds of reaction of market-makers and
market-takers. To see why, suppose that market-takers’ monitoring cost is relatively
small while gains from trade when a transaction occurs are equally split between
market-makers and market-takers. In this case, in equilibrium, market-takers monitor
the market more than market-makers. Thus, good prices take relatively more time
to be posted than it takes time for market-takers to hit these prices. The relatively
sluggish response of market-makers slows down trading since trades happen when
5It is well-known that liquidity externalities create coordination problems among traders, which
lead to multiple equilibria with diﬀering levels of liquidity (see Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), Pagano
(1989), and Dow (2004) for example). In contrast to the extant literature, our model emphasizes
the egg and chicken problem that exists between traders posting quotes on the one hand and traders
hitting quotes on the other hand.
4the bid-ask spread is tight. To achieve a higher trading rate, the trading platform
can reduce its fee on market-makers while increasing its fee on market-takers by the
same amount. Its total proﬁt per trade is unchanged but market-makers have now
a higher incentive to quickly improve upon unaggressive quotes. Thus, good prices,
hence trades, are more frequent.
Following this logic, we ﬁnd that the optimal make fee relative to the optimal
take fee increases in (i) the tick size, (ii) the ratio of the number of market-makers
to the number of market-takers, and (iii) the ratio of market-takers’ monitoring cost
to market-makers’ monitoring cost. Indeed, in equilibrium, an increase in these pa-
rameters raises the speed at which good prices are posted relative to the speed at
which they are hit. Thus, the need to incentivize market-makers is lower.
Third, we study the eﬀect of algorithmic trading by considering the impact of
a decrease in monitoring cost in our model. The model implies a strong positive
relationship between algorithmic trading and the trading rate (as found empirically
in Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2009)). For instance, consider a decrease in
the monitoring cost for market-takers. This decrease leads market-takers to hit good
prices more quickly, which in itself contributes to increase the trading rate. But, as
liquidity is consumed more quickly, market-makers react by supplying liquidity more
quickly as well. This feedback eﬀect contributes to increase the trading rate even
more.
Algorithmic trading leads to a faster market but its impact on the bid-ask spread
is ambiguous. It depends on whether algorithmic trading makes market-takers or
market-makers relatively faster. For instance, as just explained, a decrease in market-
takers’ monitoring cost increases the speed of reaction to changes in the state of the
market for both sides. But this increase is stronger for the market-takers. Thus,
when market-takers’ monitoring cost declines, liquidity is consumed relatively more
quickly than it is supplied and as a consequence the bid-ask spread increases on
average. In contrast, when market-makers’ monitoring cost is reduced, liquidity is
supplied relatively more quickly than it is consumed and as a result the bid-ask spread
declines on average.
Finally, we ﬁnd that algorithmic trading is always associated with an increase in
welfare measured by the sum of all market participants’ expected proﬁts. The reason
is that it leads to an increase in the trading rate and therefore the rate at which
gains from trade are realized. In contrast, its eﬀect on the expected proﬁto fe a c h
5participant depends on whether make/take fees are ﬁxed or not. When make/take
fees are ﬁxed, algorithmic trading makes all market participants better oﬀ as all
traders beneﬁt from an increase in the trading rate. This is not necessarily the case
when fees are endogenous. For instance, market-makers are charged a higher fee and
market-takers a smaller fee when market-makers’ monitoring cost declines. Thus,
growth of algorithmic trading on the market-making side makes market-takers better
oﬀ but, paradoxically, it can make market-makers worse oﬀ.
Our study is related to several strands of research. Foucault, Roëll and Sandås
(2003) and Liu (2008) provide theoretical and empirical analyses of market-making
with costly monitoring. However, the eﬀects in these models are driven by market-
makers’ exposure to adverse selection. Our paper also contributes to the growing
literature on the eﬀects of algorithmic trading (e.g., Biais and Weill (2008), Fou-
cault and Menkveld (2008), Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) or Hendershott, Jones, and
Menkveld (2009)). It also relates to the literature on payment for order ﬂow (e.g.,
Kandel and Marx (1999) or Parlour and Rajan (2003)). But this literature focuses on
why rebates for liquidity takers, rather than liquidity makers, can be optimal. In our
theory, depending on market structure, either type of rebate can be optimal. Finally,
our model contributes to the burgeoning literature on “two-sided markets,” i.e., mar-
kets in which the volume of transactions depends on the allocation of the total fee
per trade between the end-users (see Rochet and Tirole (2006) for a survey).6
Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we study the equilibrium of the model
when make/take fees are ﬁxed. We derive the optimal make/take fees in Section 4
and we provide a detailed discussion of the implications of the model in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2M o d e l
2.1 Market participants
We consider a market for a security with two sides: “market-makers” and “market-
takers.” Market-makers post quotes (limit orders) whereas market-takers hit these
quotes (submit market orders) to complete a transaction. The number of market-
makers and market-takers is, respectively, M and N. All participants are risk neutral.
6Examples of two-sided markets include videogames platforms, payment card systems etc...See
Rochet and Tirole (2006).
6We view the market-makers as ﬁrms that specialize in high frequency market-
making (for instance, Global Electronic Trading company (GETCO), Optiver, Tim-
berhill or Tradebots Systems). The market-taking side represents investors who break
their large orders and feed them piecemeal when the bid-ask spread is tight to mini-
mize their trading costs.7 Both types increasingly use highly automated algorithms
to detect and exploit trading opportunities.
In reality, the divide between the market-making side and the market-taking side
is not as rigid as assumed here. For instance, electronic market-makers sometimes
use market orders. Yet, there is some specialization as electronic market-makers
account for a large fraction of liquidity supply on electronic markets.8 Our assumption
captures this feature.9
The expected payoﬀ of the security is v0. Market-takers value the security at
v0 +L, where L>0, while market-makers value the security at v0. Heterogeneity in
traders’ valuation creates gains from trade (as, for instance, in Duﬃe et al. (2005)
or Holliﬁeld et al. (2004)). As market-takers have a higher valuation, they buy
the security from market-makers. Thus, our model describes “the upper half” of
the market characterized by limit sell orders and market buy orders. In a more
complex model, market-takers could have either high or low valuations relative to
market-makers, so that they can be buyers or sellers. This possibility adds some
mathematical complexity to the model, but provides no additional economic insight.
Market-makers and market-takers meet on a trading platform with a positive
tick-size denoted by ∆,w i t h∆ ≥ L.T h e ﬁrst price on the grid above v0 is half
at i c ka b o v ev0.L e t a ≡ v0 + ∆
2 be this price. All trades take place at this price
because market-takers’ do not trade at a price higher than a (as, L ≤ ∆) and market-
makers lose money if they trade at a price smaller than a (as, a − ∆ <v 0). Thus,
we focus on a “one tick market” as in Parlour (1998) or Large (2009). As in these
models, a large number of shares is oﬀered for sale at price a + ∆ by a fringe of
competitive traders. The cost of liquidity provision for these traders is higher than
7Obizhaeva and Wang (2006) solve the dynamic optimization of such traders, assuming that they
exclusively use market orders as we do here.
8For instance, Schack and Gawronski (2008) write on page 74 that: “based on our knowledge of
how they do business [...], we believe that they [electronic market-makers] may be generating two-
thirds or more of total daily volume today, dwarﬁng the activity of institutional investors.”
9In some cases, this specialization is imposed by the trading platform. For instance, only desig-
nated market-makers can post limit orders on EuroMTS (a trading platform for government bonds
in Europe).
7for the electronic market-makers and therefore they cannot intervene proﬁtably at
price a. Thus, the (half) bid-ask spread is either competitive (∆
2 ) or non competitive
(3∆
2 ), when there is no oﬀer at price a.
There is an upper bound (normalized to one) on the number of shares that can
be proﬁtably oﬀered at price a. This upper bound rules out the uninteresting case
in which a single market-maker or multiple market-makers oﬀer an inﬁnite quantity
at price a. In a more complex model, the upper bound could derive from an upward
marginal cost of liquidity provision due, for instance, to exposure to informed trading
as in Glosten (1994) or Sandås (2001).
The trading platform charges make/take trading fees each time a trade occurs.
The fee (per share) paid by a market-maker is denoted cm, whereas the fee paid by a
market-taker is denoted ct. We normalize the cost of processing trades for the trading
platform to zero so that, per transaction, the platform earns a proﬁto f
c ≡ cm + ct.
Introducing an order processing cost per trade is straightforward and does not change
the results.
Thus, for each transaction, the gain from trade (L) is split between the parties to
the transaction and the trading platform as follows: the market-taker obtains









and the platform obtains ¯ c. Consequently, the gains from trade accruing to market-
makers and market-takers are πt+πm = L−¯ c. We focus on the case 0 ≤ ¯ c ≤ L since
otherwise at least one side loses money on each trade, and would therefore choose
not to participate.
We allow make/take fees to be negative, but such rebates cannot exceed half the
tick size. Thus, even in the presence of rebates, it cannot be optimal for market-
makers to trade at a−∆ or for market-takers to trade at a+∆. As shown in Section
4, in our set-up, this constraint on the size of liquidity rebates is not binding. In
practice (see Table 1) rebates are much smaller than half a tick size (a penny in U.S.
markets).
8At various points in the analysis, we study the eﬀect of a small change in the
make/take fees. The existence of a minimum price variation is important for this
analysis as it prevents market-makers from neutralizing a change in the fees by ad-
justing their quotes.10
Our setup is clearly very stylized. Yet, it captures in the simplest possible way
the essence of the liquidity cycles described in the introduction. Speciﬁcally, when
there is no quote at a, there is a proﬁt opportunity for market-makers. Indeed,
the ﬁrst market-maker who submits an oﬀer at this price will serve the next buy
market order and earns πm. Conversely, when there is an oﬀer at a,t h e r ei sa
proﬁt opportunity (worth πt) for a market-taker. After a trade, the bid-ask spread
widens. Consequently, the market oscillates between a state in which there is a proﬁt
opportunity for market-makers and a state in which there is a proﬁt opportunity for
market-takers. Thus, market-makers and market-takers have an incentive to monitor
the market. Market-makers are looking for periods when liquidity is scarce and
market-takers are looking for periods when liquidity is abundant. Possible extensions
of the model are discussed in the conclusion.
2.2 Cycles, Monitoring, and Timing
We now deﬁne the notion of “cycles,” describe how we model market monitoring, and
explain the timing of the game.
Cycles. This is an inﬁnite horizon model with a continuous time line. At each point
in time the market can be in one of two states:
1. State E (for Empty)— no oﬀer is posted at a.
2. State F (for Full)— an oﬀer for one share is posted at a.
Thus F is the state in which the (half) bid-ask spread is competitive (the limit
order book is Full at price a)w h e r e a sE is the state in which the bid-ask spread is
not competitive (the limit order book is Empty at price a). The market moves from
state F to state E when a market-taker hits the best oﬀer. Thus, the bid-ask spread
remains large until a market-maker posts the competitive oﬀer. At this point the
bid-ask spread reverts to the competitive level, i.e., the market moves from state E
10For instance, if the make fee increases by 1% of the tick size, market-makers cannot neutralize
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Figure 1: Flow of Events in a Cycle
to state F. Then, the process starts over. We call the ﬂow of events from the moment
the market gets into state E until it returns into this state - a “make/take cycle”o r
for brevity just a “cycle.” Figure 1 illustrates the ﬂow of events in a cycle.
Monitoring. Each market-maker and each market-taker monitor the market to be
the ﬁrst to detect a proﬁt opportunity on her or his side. We formalize monitoring as
follows. Each market-maker i =1 ,...,M inspects the market according to a Poisson
process with parameter λi, that characterizes her monitoring intensity. As a result,
the time between two inspections by market-maker i is distributed exponentially with
an average inter-inspection time of 1
λi. Similarly, each market-taker j =1 ,...,N in-
spects the market according to a Poisson process with parameter μj.11 The aggregate
monitoring level of the market-making side is
¯ λ ≡ λ1 + ... + λM,
11This approach rules out deterministic monitoring such as inspecting the market exactly once
every certain number of minutes. In reality, many unforeseen events can capture the attention of a
market-maker or a market-taker, be it human or a machine. For humans, the need to monitor several
securities as well as perform other tasks precludes evenly spaced inspections. Computers face similar
constraints as periods of high transaction volume, and unexpectedly high traﬃc on communication
lines prevent monitoring at exact points in time.
10and the aggregate monitoring level of the market-taking side is
¯ μ ≡ μ1 + ... + μN.
When a market-maker inspects the market she learns whether it is in state E or
F. If the bid-ask spread is not competitive (state E) then she posts an oﬀer at a.I fi t
is competitive (state F), the market-maker stays put until her next inspection. Simi-
larly, a market-taker submits a market order when, upon inspection, he observes that
the bid-ask spread is competitive, and stays put until the next inspection otherwise.12
Thus, the duration from a trade to a competitive quote (state E to state F)i s
exponentially distributed with parameter λ and the duration from a competitive quote
to a trade (state F to state E)i se x p o n e n t i a l l yd i s t ributed with parameter μ.A s
traders’ monitoring levels are endogenous (see below), the distributions of inter-event
durations are endogenous in the model. We denote by Dm ≡ 1
¯ λ, the expected duration
from the time the bid-ask spread widens (state E) until it becomes competitive (state
F)a n db yDt ≡ 1
¯ μ, the expected duration from the time the bid-ask spread becomes
small until a trade takes place. Notice that Dm is a measure of market resiliency since
it is low when an increase in the bid-ask spread after a trade is quickly corrected with
a more competitive oﬀer.13
Thus, on average, the duration between two trades (the average duration of a
cycle) is
D
¡¯ λ, ¯ μ
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¯ λ +¯ μ
¯ λ · ¯ μ
, (3)
and the trading rate, i.e., the average number of transactions per unit of time, is
R





¡¯ λ, ¯ μ
¢ =
¯ λ · ¯ μ
¯ λ +¯ μ
. (4)
The trading rate depends on traders’ aggregate monitoring levels and increases
when either ¯ λ or ¯ μ increase.
In practice, monitoring can be manual, by looking at a computer screen, or au-
tomated by using automated algorithms. For humans, the need to monitor several
stocks contemporaneously constrains the amount of attention dedicated to a speciﬁc
12Hall and Hautsch (2007) model the arrival of buy and sell market orders as a Poisson Process
with state-dependent intensities. They ﬁnd empirically that these intensities are higher when the
bid-ask spread is tight. This empirical ﬁnding is consistent with our assumption that market takers
submit their market orders when the bid-ask spread is competitive.
13See, for instance, Foucault et al.(2005), Large (2007) and Ro¸ su (2008) for analysises of market
resiliency.
11stock. Computers also have ﬁxed processing power that must be allocated over poten-
tially hundreds of stocks and millions of pieces of information. Prioritization of this
process is conceptually similar to the allocation of attention across diﬀerent stocks
by a human market-marker. Hence, in all cases, monitoring one market is costly,
because it reduces the monitoring capacity (or processing power) available for other
markets.
Thus, we assume that, over a time interval of length T, a market-maker choosing





iT for i =1 ,...,M. (5)






jT for j =1 ,...,N. (6)
We say that market-makers’ (resp. market-takers’) monitoring cost becomes lower
when β (resp. γ) decreases. This decline can be a result, for example, of automation
in the monitoring process and technological improvements that allow much faster
access to information. Thus, below, we analyze the eﬀect of algorithmic trading on
the trading process by considering the eﬀect of a reduction in β and γ. Parameters γ
and β must remain strictly positive, but all our results hold even if γ and β become
inﬁnitesimal so that the cost of monitoring appears negligible (which maybe is the
case with algorithmic trading). In fact, what matters for most of our implications
(e.g., the relative sizes of make/take fees) is not the absolute size of γ and β, but
their relative size,
γ
β. We denote this ratio by r ≡
γ
β.
Timing. In reality, traders can change their monitoring intensities as market con-
ditions change, whereas trading fees are ﬁxed in the short-run. For this reason, we
assume that traders choose their monitoring intensities after observing the fees set
by the trading platform. Hence the trading game unfolds in three stages as follows:
Stage 1: The trading platform chooses its make/take fees cm and ct.
Stage 2: Market-makers and market-takers simultaneously choose their monitoring in-
tensities λi and μj.
12Stage 3: From this point onward, the game is played on a continuous time line indef-
initely, with the monitoring intensities and fees determined in Stages 1 and
2.
2.3 Objective functions and equilibrium
We now describe market participants’ objective functions and deﬁne the notion of
equilibrium that we use to solve for players’ optimal actions in each stage.
Objective functions. Recall that a make/take cycle is a ﬂow of events from the
time the market is in state E until it goes back to this state. Each time a make/take
cycle is completed a transaction occurs. The probability that market-maker i is active
in this transaction is the probability that she is ﬁr s tt op o s tac o m p e t i t i v eo ﬀer at
price a after the market entered in state E. Given our assumptions on the monitoring
process, this probability is λi
λ1+...+λM = λi
¯ λ . Thus, in each cycle, the expected proﬁt
(gross of monitoring costs) for market-maker i is λi






Let ˜ nT be the (random) number of completed transactions (cycles) until time T.











As is common in inﬁnite horizon Markovian models, we assume that each player
maximizes his/her long-term (steady-state) payoﬀ per unit of time. Thus, market-
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is the expected duration of a cycle. A standard theorem from the
theory of stochastic processes (often referred to as the “Renewal Reward Theorem”










¯ λ · πm
D





¡¯ λ, ¯ μ
¢
.












13This is intuitive: the expected proﬁt of a market-maker per unit of time is his expected
proﬁtp e rt r a n s a c t i o n( λi
¯ λ ·πm) times the trading rate, less the monitoring cost. In a












Finally, in each cycle, the trading platform earns a fee ¯ c. Thus, similar arguments
show that the objective function of the exchange is:
Πe ≡ ¯ c ·R
¡¯ λ, ¯ μ
¢
=( cm + ct) ·R
¡¯ λ, ¯ μ
¢
. (10)
Liquidity Externalities and Cross-Side Complementarities. An increase in
the aggregate monitoring level of one side exerts a positive externality on the other
side since ∂Πim
∂¯ μ > 0 and
∂Πjt
∂¯ λ > 0. Intuitively, a higher aggregate monitoring in-
tensity for market-makers (resp., market-takers) increases the rate at which market-
takers (resp., market-makers) ﬁnd trading opportunities and therefore make the latter
better-oﬀ. Moreover, the marginal beneﬁt of monitoring for traders on one side in-
creases in the aggregate monitoring level of traders on the other side since ∂2Πim




> 0. For this reason, market-makers (resp., market-takers) will check the
state of the market more frequently when they expect market-takers (resp. market-
makers) to check the state of the market more frequently. Thus, market-makers
and market-takers’ monitoring decisions are self-reinforcing. In other words, liquid-
ity supply begets liquidity demand and vice versa. As we shall see, this “cross-side
complementarity” has important implications.
I nc o n t r a s t ,a ni n c r e a s ei no n et r a d e r ’ sm o nitoring level hurts the traders who are
on his or her side. That is, ∂Πim
∂λj < 0 and ∂Πit
∂μj < 0 (for j 6= i). This eﬀect captures
the fact that traders on the same side are engaged in a “horse race” to be ﬁrst to
detect a trading opportunity. In reality, keeping up with this race is a key reason for
automating order submission.14
Equilibrium. The strategies for the market-makers and market-takers are their
monitoring intensities λi and μj respectively. A strategy for the trading platform is a
menu of make/take fees (cm,c t).W es o l v et h em o d e lb a c k w a r d s .F i r s t ,f o rg i v e nf e e s ,
we look for Nash equilibria in monitoring intensities in Stage 2. A Nash equilibrium
14See for instance “Tackling latency-the algorithmic arms race,” IBM Global Business Services
report.





for all i =1 ,...,M,λ ∗
i maximizes market-maker i’s expected proﬁtp e ru n i to ft i m e
(given by (8)), and for all j =1 ,...,N, μ∗
j maximizes market-taker j’s expected proﬁt
per unit of time (given by (9)), taking the monitoring intensities of all other traders
as given. Second, given a Nash equilibrium in the monitoring intensities, we solve
for the make/take fees (c∗
m,c ∗
t) that maximize the trading platform’s expected proﬁt
(equation (10)).15
3 Equilibria with Fixed Fees
In this section we study the equilibrium monitoring intensities for given fees (cm,c t).
For all parameters values, the model has two equilibria: (i) an equilibrium with no
trade and (ii) an equilibrium with trade. Indeed, the complementarity in monitoring
decisions between market-makers and market-takers leads to a coordination problem.
To see this point, consider how the no-trade equilibrium arises. If market-makers
believe that market-takers will not monitor the trading platform, then they optimally
choose not to monitor the platform as well (λ∗
i =0 ) since monitoring is costly.
Symmetrically, if market-takers expect market-makers to pay no attention to the
trading platform then they optimally choose to be inactive (μ∗
j =0 ). Thus, traders’
beliefs that the other side will not be active are self-fulﬁlling, which result in a no-
monitoring, no-trade equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For all parameters, there is an equilibrium in which traders do not
monitor: λ∗
i = μ∗
j =0for all i ∈ {1,...,M} and j ∈ {1,...,N}. The trading rate in
this equilibrium is zero.











When z>1 (resp. z<1), the ratio of proﬁts to costs per cycle is larger for market-
makers (resp. market-takers).
15The fees cm and ct aﬀect traders’ objective functions (equations (8) and (9)) directly (through
their eﬀect on πm and πt) and indirectly, through their eﬀect on traders’ monitoring levels in equi-
librium.
15Figure 2: Low and High Liquidity Regimes. The market-maker’s best-response func-
tion, ρm (·), is plotted as a function of μ1 (the horizontal axis), whereas the market-
taker’s best-response function, ρt (·), is plotted as a function of λ1 (the vertical axis).
Proposition 2 For all parameters, there exists a unique equilibrium with trade. In
this equilibrium, traders’ monitoring intensities are given by
λ∗
i =





i =1 ,...,M (12)
μ∗
j =





j =1 ,...,N (13)
where Ω∗ i st h eu n i q u ep o s i t i v es o l u t i o nt ot h ec u b i ce q u a t i o n




¯ μ∗ = Ω∗.
As an illustration, consider the case M = N =1 . Figure 2 plots the best-response
functions, denoted by ρm (μ1) and ρt (λ1), for the market-maker and market-taker
respectively, when πm = πt =0 .5,β= γ =0 .5.16 The two best-response functions
16That is, ρm (μ1) (resp. ρt (λ1)) gives the optimal monitoring level of the market-maker (resp.
market-taker) given that the market-taker’s monitoring level is μ1 (resp. λ1).
16meet at two points (0,0) and (0.25,0.25), which are the two equilibria in this exam-
ple (from Propositions 1 and 2). It can be veriﬁed that the slope of both reaction
functions at zero is inﬁnite. Thus, in this situation, an inﬁnitesimal increase in, say,
the market-taker’s monitoring, μ1, triggers a relatively large increase in the market-
maker’s monitoring, λ1, w h i c hi nt u r nl e a d st oal a r g e rμ1, and so on. Along this
path, the trading rate on the platform builds up since it increases with monitoring
levels on either side. This process ends when traders’ monitoring levels converge to
their level in Proposition 2. These dynamics could be used to interpret the evolution
of trading on new trading platforms (e.g., Chi-X or Turquoise in Europe). The com-
plementarity between market-makers and market-takers is key here since it explains
the evolution from a low (zero) to a high trading rate equilibrium. Thus, measuring
empirically this complementarity is important. We come back on this question in
Section 5.
As the no-trade equilibrium us unstable, in the rest of the paper we focus on the
properties and implications of the equilibrium with trade.
Corollary 1 I nt h eu n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mw i t ht r a d e ,
1. The aggregate monitoring level of each side increases in the number of partici-
pants on either side ( ∂¯ λ
∗




∂N > 0 ,
∂¯ μ∗
∂M > 0)a n dd e c r e a s e si n
(i) monitoring costs (∂¯ λ
∗




∂β < 0 ,
∂¯ μ∗
∂γ < 0) or (ii) the fee per
trade charged on either side ( ∂¯ λ
∗




∂cm < 0 ,
∂¯ μ∗
∂ct < 0).
2. The trading rate decreases in (i) the monitoring costs (
∂R(¯ λ
∗,¯ μ∗)
∂β < 0 and
∂R(¯ λ
∗,¯ μ∗)
∂γ < 0) or the trading fees (
∂R(¯ λ
∗,¯ μ∗)
∂cm < 0 and
∂R(¯ λ
∗,¯ μ∗)
∂ct < 0)a n d
(ii) increases in the number of participants on either side (
∂R(¯ λ
∗,¯ μ∗)




To understand the ﬁrst part of the corollary, consider an increase in the monitor-
ing cost for market-makers. This increase reduces their individual monitoring levels,
other things equal. Consequently, the marginal beneﬁt of monitoring for market-
takers is smaller as they are less likely to ﬁnd a good price when they inspect the
market. Thus, market-takers monitor the market less intensively, even though their
own monitoring cost has not changed, which in turn induces market-makers to mon-
itor even less. The same reasoning applies for an increase in the trading fee or the
17number of participants on one side.17
Corollary 1 is interesting for two reasons. First, it implies a positive correlation
between inter-event durations since these durations are inversely related to aggregate
monitoring levels (Dm = 1
¯ λ and Dt = 1
¯ μ). For instance, consider a positive shock to
the number of market-takers. This shock increases traders’ aggregate monitoring on
both sides of the market and eventually reduces all inter-event durations. Hence, the
complementarity between liquidity suppliers and liquidity demanders oﬀers a possible
explanation for the clustering in durations observed in high frequency data (more on
this in Section 5.1).
Second, Corollary 1 implies that the eﬀect of a shock to the parameters of one side
(e.g., cm or β) on the trading rate is magniﬁed by the reaction of the other side. For
instance, if market-makers monitoring cost is reduced (β decreases), then the reaction
time of market-makers is reduced and the trading rate increases. But precisely for this
reason, market-takers monitor more and their reaction time is reduced as well, which
increases the trading rate even more. As explained in Section 5.4, this ampliﬁcation
eﬀect implies that the development of algorithmic trading should have a ﬁrst order
eﬀect on the trading rate.
Corollary 2 In equilibrium, for ﬁxed fees, the market-making side monitors the
market more (less) intensively than the market-taking side (¯ λ
∗ > ¯ μ∗)i fa n do n l y
if
z(2M−1)
2N−1 > 1.I f
z(2M−1)
2N−1 =1 , the market-making and the market-taking sides have
identical monitoring intensities.
We deﬁne the velocity ratio as the relative speed of reaction of the market-making
side vs. the market-taking side: V ≡ Dt
Dm = λ
∗
μ∗. From Corollary 2, if
z(2M−1)
(2N−1) > 1,
then market-makers post good prices after a trade more quickly than market-takers
hit these prices and V > 1. For instance, if M = N and πm
β > πt
γ ,t h em a r k e t - m a k i n g
side reacts more quickly than the market-taking side because market-makers’ cost of
missing a trading opportunity is relatively higher.
17When the number of participants on one side increases, the individual monitoring levels of the
market participants on this side may decrease. In d e e d ,a sm o r et r a d e r so no n es i d ec o m p e t ef o r
trading opportunities, the likelihood of being ﬁrst to grab this opportunity declines. This eﬀect
decreases the incentive to monitor of each participant on the side that becomes thicker. Yet, it is
small as it is oﬀset by the cross-side complementarity eﬀect, which is conducive to more monitoring
by each participant. Thus, when the number of participants on one side increases, the aggregate
monitoring of both sides increases.
18As shown in the next section, this observation is important to understand the
optimal pricing policy for the trading platform. Intuitively, a situation in which the
velocity ratio is too large or too small is suboptimal for the platform. Indeed, it
means that one side is very quick in taking advantage of trading opportunities but
this velocity does not translate into a high trading rate if the other side is relatively
very slow. Thus, in this situation, it is optimal for the trading platform to alter its
fees so as to reduce the imbalance between the velocities of both sides. The next
corollary shows how the velocity ratio changes when trading fees or other parameters
change.
Corollary 3 The velocity ratio is (a) positively related to γ, ct and M, and (b)
negatively related to β, cm and N.
Thus, the trading platform through the choice of its make-take fees determines
both the trading rate (Corollary 1) and the velocity ratio (Corollary 3). For instance,
the trading platform can reduce the velocity ratio without changing its revenue per
trade by increasing the make fee while reducing the take fee.
The thick market case. In general we do not have an explicit solution for traders’
monitoring levels because we cannot solve for Ω∗ in closed-form (Ω∗ is the unique
positive root of equation (14)). However, there are a few cases in which a closed form
solution can be obtained (e.g., M = N =1 ).18 One interesting and useful case is
when the number of participants on both sides becomes very large (both M and N
tend to inﬁnity) but the size of the market-making side relative to the size of the
market-taking side, q ≡ M
N ,r e m a i n sﬁxed. We refer to this case as “the thick market






Using this observation and Proposition 2, the next corollary provides closed-form
expressions for traders’ monitoring levels when the market is thick on both sides.
18Using Proposition 2, it is easy to verify that when M = N =1 , Ω
∗ = z
1






























(M−1)Ω∗+M . Equation (15) follows by
taking the limit as M →∞ .
19Corollary 4 (monitoring levels in the thick market case) Let q>0 be ﬁxed, and




























It is worth stressing that traders’ monitoring levels when the number of mar-
ket participants is ﬁnite quickly converge to their limit levels when the market is
thick.20 Hence, monitoring levels in the thick market case can be used to obtain
good approximations of the market behavior even for relatively low values of M and
N.
4 Determinants of the Make/Take Fees
Now, we study the fees set by the trading platform. In most of the analysis, we ﬁxt h e
total fee, ¯ c, as we are mainly interested in the optimal breakdown of this fee between
makers and takers. We refer to cm − ct as the make/take spread. The make/take
spread is positive (negative) if the market-making side pays a higher (lower) fee than
the market-taking side. Our goal is to understand how the exogenous parameters of
the model (the tick size, the monitoring costs, and the relative number of participants
on each side) aﬀect the make/take fees. For instance, we study the conditions under
which the optimal make-take spread is negative (cm <c t) ,a so f t e no b s e r v e di nr e a l i t y
(see Table 1 in the introduction).
As explained in Section 2.3, for a given total fee ¯ c, the objective function of the





Πe =( cm + ct)R(¯ λ
∗, ¯ μ∗) (17)
s.t: cm + ct =¯ c,
where ¯ λ
∗ = Mλ∗
i, ¯ μ∗ = Nμj, and λ∗
i and μ∗
j are given by Proposition 2. Trading fees
aﬀect traders’ monitoring decisions and thereby the trading rate (Corollary 1). The















, which means that the error in using Ω
∞ to
approximate for Ω
∗ is on the order of magnitude of
1
M . The proof is available upon request.
20That is, the trading platform chooses its fee structure so as to equalize the marginal
(negative) impact of an increase in each fee on the trading rate.
We denote by ηmm and ηmt the elasticities of the aggregate monitoring levels of
the market-taking side and the market-making side to the fee charged on market-
makers. Similarly, ηtt and ηtm are the elasticities of traders’ aggregate monitoring

























The cross-side complementarity implies that ηmt < 0 and ηtm < 0 (when fees are
positive). Using equation (18), we obtain the following result.























Thus, it is optimal to charge diﬀerent fees on market-makers and market-takers,
unless h =1 . Interestingly, the optimal fee structure (h) depends on the cross-side
elasticities of the aggregate monitoring levels to the fees. Indeed, an increase in the fee
on one side has a “double” negative eﬀect on the trading rate since it also, indirectly,
negatively aﬀects monitoring of the other side.
Proposition 3 does not provide a closed-form solution for the trading fees since
the elasticities of monitoring levels to trading fees depend on the fees. However, we
can obtain an analytical solution when the market is thick. Therefore, we ﬁrst study
the eﬀects of the exogenous parameters on the make-take fees in this case (Section
4.1). Then, using numerical simulations, we show that the conclusions obtained in
this polar case are robust for arbitrary values of M and N (Section 4.2).
4.1 Optimal fees when the market is thick
As shown in Corollary 4, traders’ individual monitoring levels remain strictly positive
when the market is thick (i.e., M and N tend to inﬁnity, but M
N = q). Thus, as
21the market becomes thick, traders’ aggregate monitoring levels and the trading rate
explode. Yet, the fee structure that maximizes the trading rate converges to a well-
deﬁned limit, as shown in our next proposition.
Proposition 4 In the thick market case, the trading platform optimally allocates its




























and the equilibrium monitoring intensities are:
λ∞
i =













´2 for i,j =1 ,2,... (23)
Using these results we can study how the tick size, the monitoring costs and the
ratio of market participants on both sides determine the optimal make/take spread
(c∗
m − c∗






+¯ c. Using equation (21), we obtain
the following implication.
Corollary 5 In the thick market case, the make-take spread increases with (i) the
tick size, ∆; (ii) the relative size of the market-making side, q; and (iii) the relative
monitoring cost for the market-taking side, r. Moreover the make-take spread is
negative if and only if ∆ < ¯ ∆(q,r).
Figure 3 illustrates the set of parameters for which the make/take spread is nega-
tive or positive. The make-take spread is more likely to be negative when (i) the tick
size is small, (ii) the number of market-makers is relatively small, or (iii) the mon-
itoring cost for market-makers is relatively large. Hence, the optimal pricing policy
follows a simple principle: the make fee should increase relative to the take fee when
a change in parameters raises market-makers’ aggregate monitoring. In other words,
the trading platform uses its make/take fees to correct too large imbalances in the





















Figure 3: Determinants of the relative sizes of the make/take fees
The reason for this is intuitive. For instance, suppose that the tick size is large. In
this case, market-makers obtain a relatively high fraction of the gains from trade when
they participate in a transaction (other things equal, πm
πm+πt increases in ∆). Thus,
market-makers have a high incentive to monitor the market while market-takers have
a relatively low incentive to do so.21 As a result, good prices are posted very quickly
after a trade but market-takers are relatively slow to hit these prices. In this case,
it is optimal for the platform to lower its fee on market-takers, to accelerate their
response to good prices, and increase its fee on market-makers since their corrective
response to wide spreads is already quick. Thus, its revenue per trade is unchanged
but the trading rate is higher and ﬁnally the expected proﬁt of the platform per unit
of time is higher.
Hence, the platform responds to an increase in the tick size (which fosters more
monitoring by market-makers, other things equal) by raising its make fee and cutting
its take fee. As a result, the make-take spread increases. The eﬀect of other para-
meters (q or r =
γ
β)o nt h em a k e / t a k es p r e a dc a nb ei n t e r p r e t e di nt h es a m ew a y .
Intuitively, an increase in the relative size of the market-making side (a higher q)o r
a decrease in its relative monitoring cost (a higher r) result in a higher monitoring
21Other authors have noticed that a large tick size encourage liquidity providers to be active in
a stock. See, for instance, Harris (1990), Angel (1997) and Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001) for an
empirical test.
23intensity for market-makers relative to market-takers, other things equal. Thus, to
balance the speed of reactions of both sides, it is optimal for the the trading platform
to raise its fee on the market-making side when q or r increase.
Equation (21) implies that market-makers (resp. market-takers) are optimally
subsidized (they pay a negative trading fee) when the tick size is small (resp. large)
enough. However, if one side is subsidized, the optimal rebate is always strictly larger
than half the tick size (Min{c∗
m,c ∗
t}> −∆
2 since c ≤ L ≤ ∆). Thus, the constraint
we imposed on the size of these rebates is not binding for the platform, as mentioned
earlier (see Section 2.1).
Now consider the optimal choice of the total fee, ¯ c. Clearly, the platform’s
optimization problem can be decomposed into two steps: (i) choose the optimal
make/take fees for a given ¯ c (we solved this problem) and (ii) choose the optimal ¯ c.
Observe that the optimal make/take fees, (c∗
m,c ∗
t),i n c r e a s ei n¯ c, and recall that the
trading rate decreases in both the make fee and the take fee (Corollary 1). Thus, in
the second step, the trading platform faces the standard price-quantity trade-oﬀ:b y
raising ¯ c, the trading platform gets a larger revenue per trade but it decreases the
rate at which trades occur. The next corollary provides the optimal value of ¯ c for the
trading platform.
Corollary 6 In the thick market case, the trading platform maximizes its expected
proﬁt by setting its total trading fee at ¯ c = L/2 and by splitting this fee between both
sides as described in Proposition 4.
In contrast to the make/take fees, the optimal total fee for the platform is inde-
pendent of the tick size, traders’ relative monitoring costs and the relative size of the
market-making side. Thus, our results regarding the eﬀect of ∆, q,a n dr hold even if
¯ c is optimally set by the trading platform. Finally, note that our ﬁndings regarding
the optimal make/take fees hold for any level of the total fee, ¯ c. Thus, they would
hold as well if this fee were arbitrarily capped at some level (even very low).
4.2 Optimal Fees: General Case
As explained previously, we cannot obtain an analytical solution for the optimal
make/take fees for arbitrary values of M and N. However, we can numerically solve
for these fees, using the characterization of traders’ monitoring levels in Proposition
2. Using this approach, we have checked through extensive numerical simulations














































Figure 4a ‐ Tick Size and Fees Figure 4b –T h e  effect of r=    on Fees
Figure 4c –Th e Effect of q=M/N on Fees
Figure 4: Determinants of the Make/Take Fees
that the comparative static results obtained in the thick market case are robust.22
As an illustration, consider the simulations reported in Figure 4 (where the baseline
values of the parameters are: M = N = 10; γ = β =1 ;∆ =1(1 penny); L =1(1
penny); ¯ c =0 .1 (0.1 pennies).
In each panel, we plot the take fee (dotted line), the make fee (plain line) and the
make-take spread (dashed line) as a function of the tick size, ∆ (Figure 4a), the ratio
of monitoring costs, r =
γ
β (Figure 4b) and the ratio of the number of market-makers
to the number of market-takers, q = M/N (Figure 4c). Clearly the eﬀects of these
variables on the optimal make/take fees and the make-take spread are as described
in Corollary 5. Hence, the conclusions of this corollary appear robust for arbitrary
22The case in which M = N =1is another case in which we can solve for the optimal make/take
fees. The expressions for the fees in this case are very similar to those obtained in Proposition 4.










25values of the number of participants on either side.
5 Empirical Implications
5.1 Inter-Event Durations and Clustering
It is well-known that long (short) durations tend to be followed by long (short) dura-
tions in ﬁnancial markets.23 In order to account for this the clustering phenomenon,
Engle and Russell (1998) introduced the so called Autoregressive Conditional Dura-
tion (ACD) framework to model inter-event durations.
In general, the clustering phenomenon has been ascribed to asymmetric infor-
mation and interpreted using models developed by Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) or
Easley and O’Hara (1992). But Engle and Russell (1998) ﬁnd that short durations
have no eﬀect on price movements when the bid-ask spread is small and conclude
(p.1158): “this suggests that both liquidity-and information-based clustering of trans-
action rates occur.” Our model provides a liquidity-based explanation of clustering.
To see why, consider, for instance, an increase in the number of market-takers
(more generally, any factor that directly aﬀects the market-takers but not directly
the market-makers). The direct eﬀect of this shock is to increase market-takers’
aggregate monitoring level and therefore to reduce the average duration from a quote
to a trade, Dt. But, in turn, market-makers monitor the market more intensively
because makers’ and takers’ monitoring decisions are complements. Thus, there is
also a decline in the duration from a trade to a quote, Dm. This reasoning implies that
ﬂuctutations in the number of market-takers (e.g., during the day) create a positive
correlation in durations between events (Dt and Dm) and therefore a clustering in
durations between trades.
Thus, clustering in our model is a consequence of the complementarity in moni-
toring decisions between market-makers and market-takers. For this reason, it would
be interesting to directly test whether market-makers’ and market-takers’ reaction
times are complements (the “complementarity hypothesis”), that is, to test whether
an increase in Dm has a positive eﬀect on Dt and vice versa. Testing this hypoth-
esis is problematic, since inter-event durations are endogenous and simultaneously
determined in equilibrium. However, our model suggests several variables that can
serve as instruments to identify the causal eﬀect of Dm on Dt and vice versa. For
23See for instance Hasbrouck (1999) and Pacurar (2006).
26instance, an increase in the number of market-takers has a direct negative impact on
Dt but no direct impact on Dm.M o r eg e n e r a l l y ,t h ee ﬀect of the exogenous variables
of the model on, say, Dt , holding Dm ﬁxed, can be obtained from market-takers’ best
response functions. Using this observation, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7 There exist two functions f(·) and g(·) such that we can write Dm =
f(Dt;β,M,cm) and Dt = g(Dm;γ,N,ct). Furthermore,
1. Dm and Dt are complements: f(·;β,M,cm) is increasing in Dt and g(·;γ,N,ct)
is increasing in Dm.
2. f(Dt;·) is increasing in β,a n dcm, and decreasing in M,a n dg(Dm;·) is in-
creasing in γ,a n dct, and decreasing in N.
Thus, for a ﬁxed value of Dt, Dm is determined by cm, β and M. But, for a ﬁxed
value of Dm, these parameters do not aﬀect Dt. In a symmetric way, parameters ct,
γ and N aﬀect Dt but do not (directly) aﬀect Dm. Thus, empirically, trading fees or
the number of participants on either side could be used as instrumental variables to
identify the eﬀect of Dm on Dt (and Dt on Dm) using a simultaneous equations ap-
proach. For instance, time-variations in the number of market-takers should generate
variations in market-takers’ average reaction time that are independent of variations
in market-makers’ average reaction time. Similarly, cross-sectional or time-series vari-
ations in make fees should directly aﬀect the response rate of market-makers, but not
of market takers.24
5.2 Make/Take Fees and the Velocity Ratio




Actually, Corollary 3 implies that, for ﬁxed fees, this ratio should increase in q = M/N
and r =
γ
β. These implications also hold when fees are set at their optimal level. For








)1/2 =( rq)2/3. (24)
24Coopejans et al. (2001) model the dynamic feedback between liquidity suppliers and liquidity
demanders using a VAR model for depth on both sides of the limit order book. Our model suggests
an alternative approach which consists in quantifying cross-side complementarities using the speed
of reactions of each side.
27The optimal make-take spread is also positively related to r and q (see Section
4). Thus, if fees are set optimally, the model implies a positive correlation between
the make-take spread and the ratio of inter-event durations, V. This prediction is
interesting as the make-take spread varies (i) across securities for a given trading
platform (see Table 1 in the introduction) and (ii) across trading platforms, for a
g i v e ns e c u r i t y( i nw h i c hc a s eq may diﬀer across platforms). These variations provide
a way to test whether the make-take spread co-varies positively with the velocity
ratio, V.
5.3 Tick size, Make-Take Fees, and Trading Rate
Tick size and Make-Take Fees. The model implies a positive association between
the make/take spread and the tick size (see Corollary 5 and Figure 4a). Pricing
schemes used by trading platforms appear consistent with this implication. Indeed,
liquidity rebates for market-makers on the NYSE and Nasdaq, for instance, coincide
with the implementation of penny pricing on these markets. Moreover, liquidity
rebates were introduced by ECNs such as Archipelago and Island in the 90s which,
at that time, were operating on much ﬁner grids than their competitors (Nasdaq
and NYSE). Since January 2007, various options markets have implemented pilot
programs to quote and trade certain options in pennies (“The Penny Pilot”). For
these options, a few trading platforms (e.g., NYSE Arca Options and the Boston
Options Exchange) now oﬀer rebates to liquidity providers, as implied by the model
when the tick size becomes small.25 The model makes the additional prediction that
the make-take spread should be positively related to the relative size of the market-
making sector, q and the relative monitoring cost for the market-taking sector, r (see
Corollary 5 and Figures 4b and 4c).
Trading Rate and the Tick Size. The model also implies that, for ﬁxed fees, the
trading rate peaks for a strictly positive tick size. Thus, for ﬁxed fees, the relationship
between the trading rate and the tick size is non monotonic. In contrast when fees
adjust to changes in the tick size, there should be no relationship between the tick
size and the trading rate. To see this, let c∗
m(L,q,r) b et h eo p t i m a lm a k ef e ef o rt h e
platform when ∆ = L.
25See “Options maker-taker markets gain steam,” Traders Magazine, October 2007.
28Corollary 8 For ﬁxed trading fees, the tick size that maximizes the trading rate is:
∆∗ =2 ( cm − c∗
m(L,q,r)) + L>0.
Thus, the optimal tick size for the trading platform increases in the fee charged on
market-makers (cm). Moreover it decreases in the number of market-makers relative
to the number of market-takers (q) and in market-takers’ monitoring cost relative to
market-makers’ monitoring cost (r). In contrast, if the fees are set optimally, then a
change in the tick size has no eﬀect on the trading rate.
Thus, for ﬁxed trading fees, a change in the tick size should aﬀect the trading
rate but the direction of the eﬀect is ambiguous. Indeed, other things equal, a higher
tick size translates into a higher expected proﬁt for market-makers and a smaller
expected proﬁt for market-takers. Thus, an increase in the tick size is conducive
to more monitoring by market-makers but less monitoring by market-takers (even
though they expect more frequent trading opportunities). When ∆ < ∆∗,t h eﬁrst
eﬀect dominates and therefore the trading rate increases in the tick size. In contrast
the second eﬀect dominates when ∆ > ∆∗ and therefore the trading rate decreases
with the tick size. The model also implies that a decrease in the trading rate after
a reduction in the tick size is more likely for stocks for which q is small (since ∆∗ is
large when q is small). Such a decrease is also more likely when the trading fee for
market-makers is relatively high since ∆∗ increases in cm.26
Finally, a change in the tick size becomes neutral if the trading platform can
freely respond to this change by adjusting its fees (second part of the corollary). The
reason is that make/take fees and the tick size are two alternative ways to control
how trading gains are split between makers and takers. In the model, these two
instruments are perfect substitutes and therefore the maximum rate of trading is
independent of whether it is achieved by setting the tick size at ∆∗ or by adjusting
fees when the tick size deviates from ∆∗. Thus, the model makes the sharp prediction
that the eﬀect of a change in the tick size on the trading rate should be very diﬀerent
if trading fees adjust to this change or not.
T h et i c ks i z ec a nb em a n d a t e db yr e g u l a t i o no rc h o s e nb yt h et r a d i n gp l a t f o r m .
The tick size (as a percentage of the stock price) for a stock also changes after a stock
26Chakravarty et al. (2004) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant drop in the trading frequency for all trade sizes
categories after the implementation of decimal pricing on the NYSE.
29split since such a split leads to a decrease in the nominal stock price.27 Thus, the
previous corollary implies that the trading rate should change after splits, unless the
trading platform adjusts fees to neutralize the eﬀect.
5.4 Eﬀects of Algorithmic Trading
In this section, we discuss the eﬀects of algorithmic trading on the trading rate,
the bid-ask spread and welfare. Recall that we associate algorithmic trading with
smaller monitoring costs (i.e., smaller values of γ and β). All our ﬁndings hold even
if γ and β are very small. Thus, our model can account for very short delays in
traders’ reaction to the state of the market as is increasingly observed. For instance,
if M =2 0 ,N = 100, cm = ct =0 .05, β =0 .1,γ=0 .5, ∆ = L =1then in equilibrium
¯ λ ≈ ¯ μ ≈ 44. If time is measured in seconds, this means that average inter-events
time is about 23 milliseconds.
Trading Volume and Algorithmic Trading. Corollary 1 shows that a decrease
in the monitoring cost for market-makers or market-takers triggers an increase in the
trading rate. Thus, algorithmic trading should be associated with an increase in the
trading rate. This association can be particularly strong because it is magniﬁed by the
complementarity in monitoring decisions between market-makers and market-takers.
To see this point, consider Figure 5.
This ﬁgure shows how a reduction in monitoring costs for market-makers (β)
aﬀects the trading rate R,f o rﬁxed values of the other parameters (M = N =1 0 ,
L = ∆ =1 ,γ=1 ,a n dcm = ct =0 .05). The solid curve depicts the equilibrium
trading rate when 1/β increases from 0.5 to 2 (β decreases from 2 to 0.5). It accounts
for the fact that a decrease in β leads to more monitoring by market-makers, which
prompts market-takers to monitor more and therefore ampliﬁes the initial eﬀect of
β on the trading rate through a chain reaction similar to that described in Figure 2.
In contrast, the dotted curve shows the evolution of the trading rate when market-
takers’ aggregate monitoring level is ﬁxed at its equilibrium level when β =2 ,i . e . ,
when we ignore the complementarity between the two sides.
In both cases, the trading rate increases when market-makers’ monitoring cost
27Angel (1997) develops a theory of the optimal tick size for a ﬁrm based on this observation. In
his model, ﬁrms choose their tick size to minimize their cost of capital. In our model, a change in
the tick size may also aﬀect a ﬁrm value if this value is positively related to the trading rate. This
link is plausible (see Duﬃe et al. (2005) for instance) but beyond the scope of our model.
30Figure 5: Algorithmic Trading and the Trading Rate
decreases. But the trading rate increases at a much faster rate in equilibrium because
the complementarity between market-makers and market-takers ampliﬁes the eﬀect of
a decrease in market-makers’ monitoring cost. This ampliﬁcation eﬀect may explain
why the rate of increase in trading volume has been so steep in the recent years.28 For
instance, from 2005 to 2007, the number of shares traded on the NYSE rose by 111%,
despite the fact that NYSE market share has declined over the same period. This
e v o l u t i o ni sm a i n l yd r i v e nb ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h et r a d i n gr a t es i n c et h es i z eo ft r a d e s
has steadily declined in the recent years. Our model suggests that the reduction in
monitoring costs, combined with cross-side externalities, is one possible cause for this
evolution.
Bid-Ask Spread and Algorithmic Trading. A natural question is whether the
growth of algorithmic trading will result in tighter bid-ask spreads, as these are often
used as measures of market liquidity. The best ask price is either competitive (equal
to a−v0) or not competitive (equal to a+∆−v0).29 In each cycle, the bid-ask spread
28In this discussion, we have taken the fees as being ﬁxed. It can be checked, using the enveloppe
theorem, that the conclusions are unchanged if the fees are set optimally. In fact, the eﬀect of a
reduction in β is then even stronger since for each value of β, the trading platform adjusts its fees
so as to maximize the trading rate.
29Recall that a large number of shares is oﬀered for sale at price a + ∆ by a fringe of competitive
traders.
31is competitive for an average duration Dt and uncompetitive for an average duration
Dm. Thus, the average half bid-ask spread (denoted ES)i s :
ES = θa+( 1− θ)(a + ∆) − v0 =
∆
2













an increase in this ratio means that, on average, liquidity is supplied at price a more
quickly than it is consumed. The result is a smaller bid-ask spread on average.
In equilibrium, the velocity ratio increases in the relative monitoring cost ratio,
r =
γ
β (see Corollary 3). Hence, a decrease in β reduces the bid-ask spread whereas
a decrease in γ widens the bid-ask spread. Thus, the eﬀect of algorithmic trading
on the bid ask spread depends on whether it makes market-makers or market-takers
relatively faster. In the former case, algorithmic trading should be associated with a
decline in the bid-ask spread whereas in the latter case, it should lead to an increase
in the bid-ask spread.
This logic also implies that the impact of faster trading on the bid-ask spread
depends on whether trading is faster because market-makers respond more quickly
to trades or because market-takers respond more quickly to good prices. Indeed, a
decrease in β or γ leads both to a faster market (the trading rate increases). But in
the ﬁrst case, the average quoted bid-ask spread declines whereas in the second case
the average quoted bid-ask spread increases. Thus, it is not the speed of trading that
aﬀects the bid-ask spread, but the velocity ratio.
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2009) consider a change in the organization
of the NYSE that made algorithmic trading easier for liquidity suppliers. They
ﬁnd empirically that this change reduces the quoted bid-ask spread, as predicted
by our model. In contrast, Hendershott and Moulton (2009) study a change in the
organization of the NYSE that increases the speed at which liquidity demanders can
react to new quotes (i.e., that reduces Dt). They ﬁnd an increase in the quoted
bid-ask spread following this event, which again is in line with the logic of the model.
Welfare and algorithmic trading. Algorithmic trading is often portrayed as
socially useless as the gains of algorithmic traders are obtained at the expense of
other traders (see for instance Krugman (2009)). To study this question, we analyze
32the eﬀect of a decrease in traders’ monitoring costs (β or γ) on (i) each participant’s
expected proﬁts and (ii) on their aggregate expected proﬁt( W). Using equations (8),









· L − M · Cm(λ∗
1) − N · Ct(μ∗
1).
Thus, other things being equal, market participants’ aggregate welfare increases in
the trading rate. Corollary 1 shows that a decrease in traders’ monitoring costs on
either side results in a higher trading rate. For this reason, algorithmic trading (a
decrease in β or γ)i ss o c i a l l yb e n e ﬁcial in our set-up, as shown in the next corollary.
The result is indeed even stronger since, other things equal, the expected proﬁto f
each participant increases when β or γ decreases. Thus, algorithmic trading results
in a Pareto improvement when trading fees are ﬁxed.
Corollary 9 For ﬁxed trading fees, the total expected proﬁt of each participant (market-
makers, market-takers, and the trading platform) and therefore aggregate welfare in-
creases when β or γ decreases.
These results hold for ﬁxed fees. When fees are optimally set by the platform, the
w e l f a r ea n a l y s i si sm o r ec o m p l e x .I ti ss t i l lt h ec a s et h a ta g g r e g a t ew e l f a r ei n c r e a s e s
with algorithmic trading but, counter-intuitively, the side with declining monitoring
costs can sometimes be worse oﬀ.
To see why, suppose that β decreases. Following this change, the trading platform
adjusts its fees, then (i) the make fee increases, (ii) the take fee decreases and (iii)
the total fee is unchanged (see Section 4). In choosing optimally its fees, the trading
platform ampliﬁes the eﬀect of the decrease in β on the trading rate. Thus, it gets
a larger expected proﬁt. As the total fee is unchanged and the take fee is smaller,
market-takers are also clearly better oﬀ. But this gain is obtained at the expense of
the market-makers since they end up paying a larger fee. The net eﬀect of a decrease
in β on market-makers’ welfare is therefore ambiguous when fees are endogenous.
This point can be easily seen when M = N =1 . In this case, in equilibrium, the















Thus, the market-maker’s expected proﬁt decreases in γ. That is, a reduction in
the market-taker’s monitoring cost always makes the market-maker better oﬀ.I n
contrast, the market-maker’s expected proﬁt is non monotonic in β and goes to zero
when β goes to zero. Thus, a decline in the market-maker’s monitoring cost can
make her worse oﬀ. Actually, in this case, the trading platform charges a higher fee
on the market-maker. As a consequence, part of the cost reduction in monitoring is
transferred to the market-taker. Symmetric results are obtained for market-takers.
It is worth stressing two limitations here. First, as explained previously, algo-
rithmic trading can sometimes result in a higher average bid-ask spread. This eﬀect
does not aﬀect market-takers’ welfare in our set up because they only trade when
the bid-ask spread is small. In reality, some market-takers might be willing to trade
at worse prices than the competitive quotes and these traders will be hurt when the
bid-ask spread becomes larger on average.31 Second, we do not model why investors
want to trade (L is exogenous). For these reasons, our welfare results must be inter-
preted cautiously. Yet, they suggest that accounting for make/take fees is important
for welfare analyses of changes in market structure.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we develop a model of trading in which traders react with a de-
lay to proﬁt opportunities because monitoring the market is costly. One group
of traders (“market-makers”) specializes in posting quotes while another group of
traders (“market-takers”) specializes in hitting quotes. Each market-maker monitors
t h em a r k e tt ob et h eﬁrst to submit the competitive quote after a transaction. Each
market-taker monitors the market to be the ﬁrst to hit the competitive quote. In this
30D e t a i l e dc a l c u l a t i o n sa r es k i p p e df o rb r e v i t y .T h e yc a nb eo b t a i n e du p o nr e q u e s t .W ep r o v i d e
the expression for market-makers’ expected proﬁt for an arbitrary value of the total fee charged by
the platform. This does not aﬀect our conclusion here since the optimal total fee in this case is
c = L/2, as in the thick market case, and is therefore independent of β and γ .
31One way to introduce this eﬀect in the model is to assume that there are market-takers with
a ﬁxed (exogenous) monitoring intensity who are willing to buy the security at a or a + ∆.T h e s e
traders are hurt if the best oﬀer is more likely to be a + ∆ when they inspect the market.
34way, we model the high frequency make/take l i q u i d i t yc y c l e so b s e r v e di ne l e c t r o n i c
limit order markets.
In our theory, the monitoring decisions of market-makers on the one hand and
market-takers on the other hand are self-reinforcing. This feature has several impli-
cations. First, it creates a coordination problem between market-makers and market-
takers that results in multiple equilibria with diﬀering levels of trading activity. Sec-
ond, it implies that the speed at which market-takers consume liquidity is positively
related to the speed at which market-makers supply liquidity and vice versa. This
property oﬀers a new explanation for the clustering in durations between trades.
The theory also has implications for make/take fees. These fees aﬀect the trading
rate because they determine how gains from trade are split between market-makers
and market-takers and thereby the incentive of each side to respond promptly to a
change in the state of the market. As a consequence, there is a breakdown of the total
fee between the two sides that maximizes the trading rate. In particular, it is optimal
for the trading platform to charge lower fees on market-makers when (i) the tick size
is low, (ii) the number of market-makers relative to the number of market-takers is
low or (iii) the monitoring cost of market-takers relative to the monitoring costs of
market-makers is low.
We also use the model to study the eﬀect of algorithmic trading (that we interpret
as a reduction of monitoring costs). The model implies that algorithmic trading
should lead to a sharp increase in the trading rate. Moreover, it should lead to
a decrease in the bid-ask spread if and only if it increases the speed of reaction
of market-makers relative to the speed of reaction of market-takers (the “velocity
ratio”). Last, algorithmic trading is socially beneﬁcial because it increases the rate at
which gains from trade are realized. Yet, adjustments in trading fees redistribute the
social gain of algorithmic trading between participants. For this reason, automation
of one side may, counter-intuitively, make this side worse oﬀ after adjustments in
make/take fees.
The model could be extended in many directions. First, in reality, market-makers
are exposed to adverse changes in the value of the security. They can reduce this risk
by monitoring the ﬂow of information and cancel their quotes when new information
arrives (see Foucault et al. (2003) for a theoretical analysis). It would be interesting
to incorporate this possibility in the model. Intuitively, exposure to informed trading
reduces market-makers’ expected proﬁts and should therefore lead to higher make
35fees, other things equal. Second, in our model, traders do not choose the side on
which they are active. An interesting extension would be to endogenize the num-
ber of makers and takers by allowing traders to choose their side. Last, our model
considers a single trading platform. In reality, securities often trade on multiple
platforms. The economic forces analyzed in our paper should still hold in a multi-
market environment as long as monitoring is costly. In particular, the make/take fees
charged by a platform should still aﬀect its trading rate as they will aﬀect makers
and takers’ incentives to monitor the platform. Yet, inter-market competition may
add other considerations to the choice of make/take fees. Moreover, considering the
multi-market environment may allow to model the opportunity cost of monitoring,
which is exogenous in our set-up.
7A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Direct from the argument in the text.
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Summing over all i =1 ,...M,w eo b t a i n
¯ μ
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= ¯ λ. (28)
Similarly, for market-takers we obtain,
¯ λ
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N − ¯ μ
¢







¯ μ. Dividing the left-hand-side of (28) and (29) by ¯ μ2 we obtain,





= ¯ λ. (30)






Dividing these two equations gives,
(M +( M − 1)Ω)
Ω2 ((1 + Ω)N − 1)
z =1 , (32)
36or equivalently,
Ω3N +( N − 1)Ω2 − (M − 1)zΩ − Mz =0 .
We argue that this cubic equation has a unique positive solution. Indeed, this equa-
tion is equivalent to











Function g(·,M,N,z) decreases in Ω. It tends to plus inﬁnity as Ω goes to zero, and
to −N−1
N as Ω goes to inﬁnity. Thus, (33) has a unique positive solution that we
denote by Ω∗. We obtain the aggregate monitoring levels in equilibrium by inserting
this root into Equations (30) and (31).
Now note that the equilibrium trading strategies must symmetric among the
market-makers and market-takers. That is, λ∗
1 = λ∗





N.32 Hence, in equilibrium λi = ¯ λ/M and μj =¯ μ/N for all i,j. This completes
the proof.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 : Recall that Ω∗ is such that:
Ω∗ = g(Ω∗,M,N,z), (35)
where g(·) is deﬁned in equation (34). It is immediate that g(·) increases in M,



























2. Then, from (27),
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2 - a contradiction.
37Hence, ∂¯ λ
∗












Thus, using equations (36) and (37), we conclude that
¯ λ
∗
¯ μ∗ increases in M and decreases
in N. Equation (39) implies that ¯ μ∗ increases in M.T h u si tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a t
¯ λ
∗ increases in M as well. A similar argument shows that ¯ μ∗ increases in N.
Now, consider the eﬀect of a change in β on market-takers’ monitoring intensities.


































∂Ω∗ > 0.M o r e o v e r∂Ω∗
∂z > 0 and ∂z







∂β < 0.N o w ,s i n c e¯ λ















∂β < 0. The impact of make/take fees on traders’ aggregate monitor-
ing levels of is obtained in the same way. The second part of the corollary directly
follows from the ﬁrst part and the deﬁnition of the trading rate (equation (4)).
Proof of Corollary 2: Recall that
¯ λ
∗
¯ μ∗ = Ω∗. Using equation (14), it is readily
checked that Ω∗ =1if and only if z = 2N−1
2M−1.T h u s ,¯ λ
∗ =¯ μ∗ if and only if z = 2N−1
2M−1.
Moreover, as shown in the proof of Corollary 1, Ω∗ increases in z.H e n c e ,¯ λ
∗ > ¯ μ∗ iﬀ
z>2N−1
2M−1.




¯ μ∗ = Ω∗. We know from the proof of
Corollary 1 that Ω∗ increases in z and M and decreases in N. The corollary is then
immediate using the deﬁnition of z (equation (11)).
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A similar argument is used to derive μ∞
j .







































¯ μ∗ ). (41)


















Now, (20) follows directly from this equation and the fact that cm + ct =¯ c.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :We ﬁx q>0, and let N = M
q . Note that there is a one-
to-one mapping between the fees charged by the trading platform and the per trade
trading proﬁts obtained by the market-making side and the market-taking side, πm
and πt. Thus, instead of using cm and ct as the decision variables of the platform,
we can use πm and πt. It turns out that this is easier. Thus, for a ﬁxed ¯ c, we rewrite
the platform’s problem as:
Maxπm,πtR(¯ λ
∗, ¯ μ∗)
s.t πt + πm = L − ¯ c.
39Moreover, using that πm = L − ¯ c − πt, we can present R(¯ λ
∗, ¯ μ∗) as a function of πt









































Since the ﬁrst order condition holds for any M, w ec a nt a k el i m i t so nb o t hs i d e s
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1 is given by (16). Plugging back into (44) and simplifying yields
1 −
q(L − ¯ c − πt)
Ω∞ (1 + Ω∞)
·
























































From (47) we obtain,
πt =






πm = L − ¯ c − πt =





































ct = L −
∆
2









Finally, the monitoring intensities in the large market are obtained by plugging
these expressions into Corollary 4.
Proof of Corollary 5: The result follows directly from equation (21)
41P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y6 :We ﬁx q>0, and let N = M
q .For any given M, maximizing
R(λ∗,μ ∗)¯ c is equivalent to maximizing
R(λ∗,μ∗)
M ¯ c, which in turn (using (42) and that
¯ λ
∗ = Mλ∗
1)i se q u i v a l e n tt om a x i m i z i n g
λ∗
1
1+Ω∗¯ c. Denote H(¯ c) ≡
λ∗
1
1+Ω∗. Then, to ﬁnd





The FOC for a given M is
H(¯ c)+H0 (¯ c)¯ c =0 . (52)
Note that H depends on ¯ c only through its dependence on λ∗









































´3 (using (23) and (51)).






































And, in the limit (52) becomes













´3¯ c =0 ,
which gives ¯ c = L
2.
Proof of Corollary 7: Using equation (30) in the proof of Proposition 2, we deduce
that for a ﬁxed ¯ μ, market-makers’ aggregate monitoring level, ¯ λ solve
F(¯ λ;¯ μ,β,cm,M)=0 , (54)
42where,
F(¯ λ;¯ μ,β,cm,M) ≡ M +
(M − 1)πm¯ λ
¯ μ




It is easily shown that for all parameter values, equation (54) has a unique positive






∂¯ μ |¯ λ=ϕ(¯ μ;β,cm,M)
∂F
∂¯ λ |¯ λ=ϕ(¯ μ;β,cm,M)
.
Using the expression for F(·),w eo b t a i n∂F
∂¯ μ |¯ λ=ϕ(¯ μ;β,cm,M)> 0 and ∂F
∂¯ λ |¯ λ=ϕ(¯ μ;β,cm,M)<








Dt ;β,cm,M). Then, from equation (55), we deduce that
∂f
∂Dt > 0.T h er e s u l tf o rg is established in a parallel manner. This completes the ﬁrst
part of the corollary. The second part is obtained using a similar arguments (again
applying the implicit function theorem). We omit the details for brevity.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y8 :Deﬁne ˆ cm = L
2 − ∆
2 + cm and ˆ ct = c − ˆ cm = ∆
2 − L
2 + ct.
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These payoﬀs are those obtained when ∆ = L and fees are set at ˆ cm and ˆ ct.T h u s ,







These values are independent of the tick size. Thus, for arbitrary values of the fees,
the trading platform can make sure that the trading rate is maximal by setting a tick







+ cm = c∗
m(L,q,r),
43that is ∆∗ =2 ( cm − c∗
m(L,q,r)) + L.
Moreover, when the fees are set at their optimal values, traders’ expected proﬁts
do not depend on the tick size since traders’ expected payoﬀsa tt h eo p t i m a lf e e sd o
not depend on the tick size (e.g., Πim(λi;ˆ c∗
m) does not depend on ∆). Thus, their
optimal monitoring levels and therefore the trading rate does not depend on the tick
size, which proves the second part of the corollary.



























































Now, the envelope theorem implies that
∂Πjt
∂μ∗




∗ > 0 for all j, and Corollary 1 yields ∂¯ λ
∗
∂γ < 0 and
∂¯ λ
∗










∂β =0 .T h u s ,dΠt
dγ < 0 and
dΠt
dβ < 0. This establishes the ﬁrst part of the proposition for the market-taking side.
The proof for the market-makers is parallel. Last, we have proved in Corollary 1 that
the trading rate decreases when β or γ increases. It follows that the expected proﬁt
of the platform decreases with β or γ.
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